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A TAX LAWYER'S OBSERVATIONS ON
SCARY NUMBERS, POLITICS, AND
IRRESPONSIBILITY: A COMMENTARY ON
SHAVIRO'S RECKLESS DISREGARD
LAWRENCE LOKKEN*
Abstract: The fiscal gap is filled by the issuance of government debt, au
increasing portion of which is held by foreigners. Although foreigners
still seem willing to absorb large amounts of U.S. debt, international
organizations express concern over U.S. budgetary deficits. A significant
source of the fiscal gap is the Social Security system. Two changes that
might resolve Social Security funding issues include raising the
minimum age to receive full retirement benefits to seventy years old
and raising the taxable wage base. Politically, however, adopting either
of these changes soon seems impossible. In addition, current Medicare
costs will exceed current tax revenue in 2004 for the first time in recent
history. Congress could bring long-term expenditures and revenues into
balance by, for example, immediately raising the tax rate from 2.9% to
6.02% or immediately reducing benefits by 48%. If Congress defers
taking action to address the problem, however, the rate increase or
benefit reduction will need to be more substantial.
INTRODUCTION
The organizers of this symposium did not make a good choice in
asking me to comment on Professor Daniel N. Shaviro's very interest-
ing and significant article.' In this task, I suffer from at least two
handicaps. First, I have no more than a layperson's knowledge and
understanding of the issues he discusses. My expertise is in federal
income tax law. I claim no expertise in budgetary policy or in Social
Security and Medicare, the two programs Professor Shaviro identifies
as the root causes of the fiscal gap. Although I am familiar with the
technical, legal consequences of the Bush administration's tax cuts,
the tools in my professional tool chest are of little help in analyzing
4' Hugh Culverhouse Eminent Scholar in Mutation, University of Florida, Frederick G.
Levin College of Law.
1 See generally Daniel N. Shaviro, Reckless Disregard: The Bush Administration's Policy of cut-
ting Taxes in the Face of an Enormous Fiscal Gap, 45 B.C. L. REV. 1285 (2004).
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the many factors that will determine their effects on the economy in
either the short term or the long term. My comments, therefore, must
be taken only as those of an educated layperson.
Second, and perhaps even more importantly, I am an inadequate
commentator on the paper because I fully agree with the thrust of
Professor Shaviro's arguments. The architects of the morass he de-
scribes doubtlessly would not agree with his conclusions or my charac-
terization of our fiscal situation as a morass. I would like to hear what
a competent fiscal analyst in sympathy with policy developments since
the 2000 elections would say about his arguments.
At least some economists sympathetic to the Bush administra-
tion's economic policies seem to view the resulting deficits as no more
than an unpleasant side effect. Their explanations, however, do not
address the long-term effects of these deficits. For example, in a re-
cent op-ed piece in the Wall Street Journal, Wayne Angell, an appointee
of President Ronald Reagan to the Federal Reserve Board of Gover-
nors and a former chief economist of Bear Stearns, made the startling
claim that a principal cause of the recession plaguing the first several
years of the Bush administration was excessive fiscal restraint by the
Clinton administration.2 He argues that by allowing the federal debt
to fall from 46% of gross domestic product ("GDP") in 1997 to 34%
in 2001, the Clinton administration overlooked "the first principal
[sic] of macroeconomics—output growth is not sustainable without a
growth of total credit and debt." In response to this reduction, Wayne
Angell argues, the Federal Reserve Board adopted monetary policies
that prompted an unhealthy increase in household debt from 67% of
GDP in 1997 to 86% in 2003:4
For the sake of my children and grandchildren I hope for a
less hysterical view of debt—an understanding that high debt
levels compared to the ability to service the debt is a disad-
vantage to households as well as to governments. . . . Only
hysteria, an outburst of emotion and fear, could produce the
irrational response of the Congress and the public to the
2 Wayne Angell, The Rubin Recession, WALL. ST. J., Mar. 25, 2004, at A16. My reliance on
a Wall Street Journal op-ed piece is evidence, if any be needed, of my amateur status in these
matters.
s
4 See id.
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supposed danger of federal debt left to our children and
grandchildren.5
Notwithstanding this reference to children and grandchildren, Wayne
Angell's arguments focus on economic trends over less than half a
decade and seemingly assume that what is good for Americans in the
short term is also good for their children and grandchildren.6
Wayne Angell does not advocate endless, unrestrained deficits
but advises his readers to "[slave your outbursts for reining in the
growth rate of government spending."7 By restraining the rate by
which government spending increases, he argues, "we will be able to
keep tax rates conducive to faster increases in output and thereby add
to both the well-being of our people and to future tax receipts avail-
able to the Congress."8 Economists William Gale and Peter Orszag,
however, assert that the Bush administrations proposal to make per-
manent the tax cuts enacted in 2001 and 2003, which advocates of low
tax rates such as Wayne Angell presumably endorse, could be
financed only by spending reductions far beyond political feasibility. 9
They cite as examples reductions in Social Security benefits by 48% or
in Medicare benefits by 57%; complete elimination of the federal
component of the Medicaid program; a 53% cut in all spending other
than defense, homeland security, Social Security, Medicare. and
Medicaid; or an 80% cut in all domestic discretionary spending."
In sum, I am not able to provide a much-needed perspective in
this discussion. Professor Shaviro, William Gale, and Peter Orszag de-
pict Americans as lemmings rushing toward the sea, but others char-
acterize this depiction as "hysteria." I would like to hear a full expla-
nation of why I should not be hysterical.
I. U.S. INDEBTEDNESS TO FOREIGN PERSONS
The fiscal gap that Professor Shaviro discusses is plugged by the
issuance of government debt. He warns in the second paragraph of
his paper of "a major possibility of an Argentina-style meltdown in the
U.S. government's position as a borrower in world capital markets,
6 Id.
6
 See id.
7 Angell, supra note 2, at A16.
a Id.
9 William G. Gale & Peter R. Orszag, Should the President's Tax CU IS Be Made Permanent?
102 TAx NoTEs 1277, 1283-85 (2004).
'° Id.
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potentially yielding chronic inflation, unemployment, and bank and
currency crises." 11 It is relevant to this possibility that an increasing
portion of the U.S. government's debt is held by foreigners. The per-
centages of marketable U.S. Treasury securities held by foreign per-
sons, as shown by Treasury Department surveys, are as follows:
Marketable U.S. Treasury Securities"
Date Percentage Owned by Foreigners
December 1974 14.7
December 1978 12.0
December 1984 13.5
December 1989 22.0
December 1994 19.4
March 2000 35.2
June 2002 40.7
The rising percentage of foreign ownership of U.S. debt is a vote of
confidence by foreign investors in the soundness of the U.S. govern-
ment and economy. It also signals, however, that a sudden loss of this
confidence would be traumatic for the U.S. economy and for world
capital markets. Already, there are indications that private investors
are less willing to absorb new Treasury debt, a reluctance that has
been masked thus far by large purchases of such debt by foreign cen-
tral banks, raising additional economic and foreign policy concerns. 13
Although foreigners still seem willing to absorb large amounts of
U.S. debt, international organizations express concern over U.S.
budget deficits." In its 2004 economic survey of the United States, the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (the
"OECD") states the following:
" Shaviro, supra note 1, at 1289.
12 U.S. DEPT OF 'ME TREASURY Er AL., REPORT ON FOREIGN HOLDINGS OF U.S. SECU-
RITIES AS OF JUNE 30, 2002, at 5 tb1,2 (Jan. 2004), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/tic/
sh12002tpdf,
13 Greg Ip, Could Overseas Financing Hurt the U.S.?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 2004, at A2
("Foreign central banks, led by China's and Japan's, now hold close to ;1 trillion of Treas-
ury bonds and bills, almost a quarter of publicly held U.S. debt. That serves their eco-
nomic interest, but it also gives them a potential financial lever.").
14 ORG. FOR ECON. Co- OPERATION & DEV., ECONOMIC SURVEY: UNITED STATES 2004:
ENSURING FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY AND BUDGETARY DISCIPLINE, at http://www.oecd.org/
document/11/0,2340,en_2649_201185._31458443_1_1_1_1,00.hunl (last visited Oct. 15,
2004) (presenting data from ORG. FOR ECON. Co- OPERATION & DEV., 2004/7 OECD ECON.
SURVS. UNITED STATES 10-12 (May 2004)).
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The federal budget has moved from a surplus of nearly 11/2
per cent of GDP in fiscal year 2001 to a deficit of 31/2 per cent
in 2003 and a projected 4 1/4 to 41/2 per cent this year. This
rapid deterioration is attributable to sharply reduced tax re-
ceipts following the recession and the demise of the stock
market bubble combined with tax cuts and the rapid expan-
sion of defence, "homeland security" and other discretionary
outlays. While the cyclical drag on public finances should
fade soon, recent policy changes on both the revenue and
outlay sides imply that, under realistic assumptions and ab-
sent corrective action, the deficit will remain substantial over
the next ten years by both US historical and international
standards. At that time, the retirement of the baby boom
generation will be in full swing, putting enormous pressure
on entitlement programmes. Now that the recovery has
taken hold, measures to reduce the deficit are urgently
needed if the beneficial effects on long run national income
from recent marginal tax rate cuts are not to be outweighed
by the adverse consequences of the fall in public and na-
tional saving. 15
The survey further asserts the following:
Restraining both discretionary and mandatory spending,
while necessary, is unlikely to be sufficient to restore the
budget to balance over the longer term. To the extent that
revenues have to be raised, this should be done primarily by
broadening the tax base rather than by reversing recent re-
ductions in marginal tax rates. 16
The staff of the International Monetary Fund (the "IMF") has
expressed similar concerns, noting that growth of the deficit "creates
a need to service higher U.S. debt and debt payments to the rest of
the world over time, which erodes the value of the dollar, lowering
consumption in the United States and increasing it elsewhere." 17 The
IMF staff observes that the change from 2001 to 2004 in the ratio of
the budget surplus or deficit to GDP was "the largest such deteriora-
15 Id.
18 Id.
17 Nicoletta Batini, How Will the U.S. Budget Deficit Affect the Rest of the World ►, in WORLD
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK APRIL 2004: ADVANCING STRUCTURAL REFORM 67 (Intl Monetary
Fund ed., 2004), available at http://www.intf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2004/01/pdf/
chapter2.pdf.
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don over such a short time span since World War II and equal to
about 6 percent of world gross savings." 18
Increased foreign ownership of Treasury securities is not simply a
product of growth in the federal deficit. The United States has had a
deficit in the balance of trade in goods and services for every year after
1975. 19 This deficit has exceeded $100 billion for every year after 1995,
$200 billion for every year after 1998, $300 billion for every year after
1999, and $400 billion for every year after 2001. 2G The United States, as
a nation, ultimately must pay for all imported goods and services. Most
imports are paid for by exports, but the trade deficit represents imports
not paid for in this manner. The trade deficit is paid for by transferring
American factories, office buildings, and residential developments to
foreign ownership and by issuing debt to foreign persons.
Foreign ownership of U.S. assets has increased steadily in recent
decades, both in dollar amounts and in relation to U.S. ownership of
U.S. assets. In June 2002, foreign persons held long-term securities of
U.S. issuers of $3,926 billion, up from $3,558 billion in March 2000,
$1,244 billion in December 1994, $847 billion in December 1989, and
$99 billion in December 1978. 21 The June 2002 holdings included $908
billion of U.S. treasury securities, up from $39 billion in December
1978, 22
 In June 2002, foreigners owned 7.8% of all U.S. equity securities
(up from 5.1% in December 1994), 10.2% of U.S. government agency
securities (up from 5.4% in December 1994), and 15.7% of debt issued
by U.S. corporations (up from 7.8% in December 1994).23 Perhaps
Americans should be concerned that the higher taxes on future gen-
erations predicted by Professor Shaviro, William Gale, and Peter Orszag
will go, in large part, to foreign holders of U.S. debt and that the per-
sons burdened by these higher taxes will have to pay them, in large
part, from salaries and wages received from foreign employers.
19 1d. at 64.
, 19 FOREIGN TRADE DIY., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S, TRADE IN GOODS AND SERVICE—
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS (BOP) BASIS ( June 14, 2004), available at http://www.census.gov/
foreign-trade/statistics/historical/gands.pdf.
" Id.
II See U.S. DEPT OF 'TIE TREASURY ET AL., supra note 12, at 3; Carol C. Bertaut & Wil-
liam L. Griever, Recent Developments in Cross-Border Investment in Securities, 90 FED. Res. BULL.
19, 27 tb1.4 (2004), available at http://wwwlederalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2004/
winter04_if.pdf (last updated Sept. 20, 2004).
22 U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY ET AL., supra note 12, at 3.
22 Id. at 5.
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II. SOCIAL SECURITY FUNDING
As Professor Shaviro notes, the Social Security system is a
significant source of the fiscal gap. 24 Problems with the funding of So-
cial Security benefits are, in my opinion, a leading example of the dam-
age being inflicted on this country by political gridlock. Social Security
programs are funded with taxes specifically earmarked for this purpose
(FICA taxes). These programs could be funded easily and fairly by
these taxes indefinitely. Presently, the taxes ($632 billion for 2003) ex-
ceed benefit. payments ($471 billion for 2003). 25 The difference is ac-
cumulated in two trust funds, invested in Treasury securities, which
were $1,500 billion at the end of 2003. 26 Although recipients of current
benefits are increasing steadily, both in absolute number and in rela-
tion to the number of FICA taxpayers, the trust funds are expected to
continue growing until 2018.27 Thereafter, benefits will continue to
grow in relation to taxes, and given the taxes and benefits provided by
current law, the trust funds are expected to be exhausted by 2042.28 At
present rates, the dedicated taxes will be sufficient to pay only 73% of
scheduled benefits for 2042 and 68% of scheduled benefits for 2078. 28
According to the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and
Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance (the "OASDI") Trust
Funds, "[o]ver the full 75-year projection period the actuarial deficit
estimated for the combined trust funds is 1.89 percent of taxable pay-
roll."50 This deficit could be eliminated by immediately raising the coin-
billed FICA tax rate for employers and employees by 1.89% (0.945%
each), from the present combined rate of 12.4% to 14.29%. 81 Alterna-
tively, the deficit could be eliminated by immediately reducing present
and future benefits by 13%. 32 If Congress waits until the trust funds are
exhausted in 2042, however, it could continue the benefits provided by
24 Sec Shaviro, supra note 1, at 1299.
35 BD. OF TRS., FED. OLD-AGE & SURVIVORS INS. & DISABILTIY INS. TRUST FUNDS, THE
2004 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL 01.0-AGE AND SURVI-
VORS INSURANCE AND DISABILITY INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS 2 (2004) [hereinafter 2004
SOCIAL SECURITY REPORT], available at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR04/04.pdf.
26
 See id.
21 Id. at 16. The Board of Trustees estimates future costs and benefits under three sets
of assumptions: a low-cost alternative, an intermediate alternative, and a high-cost alterna-
tive. Id. at 6. The figures in the text are taken from the intermediate alternative.
28 Sec id. at 8.
"
30 2004 SOCIAL SECURITY REPORT, SliPtrinote 25, at 16.
31 Id.
32 Id.
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existing law only by raising the payroll tax rate to 16.91% and continu-
ing to raise it thereafter to 18,31% in 2078. 33 Without raising taxes,
Congress would have to reduce benefits by 27% in 2042, and continue
reducing them thereafter, with reductions reaching 32% in 2078. 34
According to the Board of Trustees, "[t] he projected trust fund
deficits should be addressed in a timely way to allow for a gradual
phasing in of the necessary changes and to provide advance notice to
workers."35
 Two changes might solve Social Security funding issues for
at least the seventy-five year window for which Social Security funding
is evaluated. First, the minimum age for receiving full retirement
benefits should be raised to seventy. Presently, the age at which a per-
son may begin collecting full retirement benefits is sixty-five years for
persons born before 1938, sixty-six years for persons born during the
years 1943-1954, and sixty-seven years for persons born after 1959. 36
The retirement age is increased by two months annually for persons
born in the years between these points. Congress could continue to
increase the retirement age by two months for each year after 1960
(e.g., sixty-seven years and two months for persons born in 1961,
sixty-seven years and four months for those born in 1962, and so on)
until the age reaches seventy. This change would not affect anyone
currently over the age of forty-five, and the full impact of the change
would affect only persons who are now quite new to the labor force.
Because this change only would reflect the increase in life expectancy
rates partially, the age may have to be raised again if life expectancies
continue to rise.
Given the means by which Social Security is funded, the issue of
retirement age is: for how many years at the end of life should one be
allowed to consume income produced by younger generations? When
the program was developed nearly seventy years ago, the answer was
only a few, because life expectancies were not substantially beyond the
retirement age. 37
 The answer has changed in the intervening years,
not because of an affirmative policy choice, but because no policy
" Id.
54 Id.
55
 2004 SOCIAL SECURITY REPORT, supra note 25, at 17.
56
 These ages were prescribed by amendments made in 1983. Social Security Amend-
ments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, §§ 201(a), 216(0, 97 Stat. 65, 107-08 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 416(1) (2000)).
57
 The average life expectancy in the United States in 1940 was 62.9 years; by 2001, it
had increased to 77.2 years. Elizabeth Arias et al., Nat'l Ctr. for Health Statistics, U.S. Dept
of Health & Human Servs., Deaths: Final Data for 2001, 52 NAT'L VITAL STAT. REP., Sept. 18,
2003, at 27 tbl.8, available at http://www.cdc.govinchs/dataitivsrinvsr52/nvsr5203.pdf,
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choice was made in response to changing life expectancies. The issue
now should be confronted directly.
Second, Congress should raise the taxable wage base (the dollar
ceiling on wages subject to the FICA taxes) with the goal of eventually
subjecting all wages to the FICA taxes. The dollar ceiling already has
been eliminated for the Medicare hospital insurance portion of the
FICA taxes. and it also should be eliminated for the OASDI portion of
the taxes." Elimination of the ceiling may raise enough revenues to
allow the tax rates to be reduced. At least for those who believe in
progressive taxation, expanding the tax base and lowering the rates
would enhance the fairness of the system.
Politically, however, adopting either of these changes soon seems
impossible. Republicans are unwilling to make any change to Social
Security without diverting some of the funding into private accounts,
which many Democrats refuse to consider for fear that the diversion
of funding would weaken the redistributive aspect of the present sys-
tem. Democrats will not vote to reduce entitlements (such as a raise in
the retirement age) without Republicans sharing the blame, and vice
versa. In other words, no political faction is willing to consider any-
thing now, when the Social Security funding problem is quite man-
ageable, except proposals that have no realistic chance of success.
III. MEDICARE FUNDING
As Professor Shaviro notes, the issue of Medicare funding is more
serious and intractable than the issue of Social Security funding." The
hospital insurance portion of Medicare (known as HI, or Medicare Part
A) is designed to be funded by payroll taxes, presently 2.9% of wages
(1.45% by employees and 1.45% by employers). 40 In the recent past,
these taxes have exceeded disbursements, and the excess has accumu-
lated in a trust fund. According to the 2004 report of the Boards of
Trustees of the Federal Hospital Insurance and Federal Supplementary
Medical Insurance Trust Funds, however, current costs will exceed cur-
" The ceiling was eliminated for Medicare taxes in 1994. I,R.C. § 3121(a)(1), amended by
Pub. L. No, 103-66, § 13207(10(1), 107 Stat. 312, 467-68 (1993). The contribution base was
increased above the Social Security tax wage base to $125,000 for 1991, $130,000 for 1992,
and $135,000 for 1993. I.R.C. § 3121(x), repealed by Pub, L. No. 103.66, § 13207(a) (2), 107
Stat. 312, 468 (1993).
39 See Shaviro, supra note 1, at 1293, 1299-03.
49 I.R.C. §§ 3101(b) (6), 3111(b)(6) (2000).
1344	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 45:1335
rent tax revenue in 2004 for the first time in recent history." Costs are
projected to exceed revenues for all subsequent years, and according to
intermediate projections, the trust fund will be exhausted in 2019, fif-
teen years from now.42 Congress could bring long-term expenditures
and revenues into balance by, for example, immediately raising the tax
rate from 2.9% to 6.02% or immediately reducing benefits by 48%." If
Congress defers action addressing the problem, the rate increase or
benefit reduction will be more substantial."
The remainder of the Medicare program, Supplementary Medi-
cal Insurance (°smr), consists of Medicare Part B, which pays for
physician, outpatient hospital, home health, and other services for
the aged and disabled, and the recently enacted Part D, which initially
provides prescription drug discount cards and transitional assistance
to low-income beneficiaries and, beginning in 2006, will subsidize vol-
untary drug insurance coverage for all beneficiaries and premium
and cost-sharing subsidies for low-income enrollees." Apart from pre-
miums paid by beneficiaries, Parts B and D are funded entirely by
general revenues of the federal government."
According to the Medicare Trustees, the Medicare Prescription
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, which intro-
duced Part D and made significant changes in Parts A and B, has ma-
jor financial implications. 47
 Total Medicare expenditures, which were
2.6% of GDP in 2003, will rise to be 3.4% of GDP in 2006, after im-
plementation of the new prescription drug benefit, and thereafter will
41 BDS. OF TRS., FED. HOSP. INS. & FED. SUPPLEMENTARY MED. INS. TRUST FUNDS, 2004
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARDS OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL HOSPITAL INSURANCE AND
FEDERAL SUPPLEMENTARY MEDICAL INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS 2 (2004) [hereinafter 2004
MEDICARE REPORT], available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/publications/trusteesreport/
2004 /tr.pdf.
42 Id. For 2003, HI taxes were 98% of HI expenditures, but this percentage is expected
to decline to 81% of costs in 2019 and 26% in 2078. Id.
" Id. at 12-13.
44 See id. at 21 ("Consideration of ... reforms should occur in the relatively near fu-
ture. The sooner the solutions are enacted, the more flexible and gradual they can be.").
45
 Id. at 1.
46 For 2003, 38.5 million people were enrolled in Supplemental Medical Insurance
("SMI"), and SMI revenues included premiums of $27.4 billion and general revenues of
$86.4. 2004 MEDICARE REPORT, supra note 41, at 3 tbli,C1. There is an SMI trust fund
consisting of any excess of general revenue appropriations and premium payments over
expenditures. Id. at 1. The balance in this trust fund was $34.3 billion at the end of 2002
and $24 billion at the end of 2003. Id. at 3.
47 Id. at 2. The introduction of Part D will add substantially to the overall cost of
Medicare ... and increase the proportion of such costs that are financed from general
revenues." Id. at 20.
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"increase rapidly to 7.7% by 2035 and to 13.8% by 2078.' 48 Medicare
taxes covered only two-thirds of expenditures for 2003 and will cover
only 55% of expenditures for 2012. 49 According to the Trustees' pro-
jections, Medicare costs will exceed Social Security expenditures by
2024 and will be almost double the latter's expenditures by 2078."
The problems of Medicare funding are, of course, only one as-
pect of a larger set of problems with healthcare in the United States.
Employer-sponsored plans have accustomed most. Americans to
healthcare on demand at minimal out-of-pocket cost. The Medicare
system derives from congressional acceptance of public expectations
that the healthcare available to working people must continue in re-
tirement. Cost pressures are driving employers to thrust more and
more healthcare expenses on their employees. Eventually, Congress
will have to respond to these cost pressures, and the American public
will have to accept. that unlimited expenditures to meet one person's
health needs may diminish the life experiences of everyone, including
the recipient of the health services.
48 Id. at 2. Table II.A2 of 2004 report of the Boards of Trustees of the Federal Hospital
Insurance and Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Funds provides more
complete data. See id. at 26 tbl.H.A2.
49 See id. at 1,
59 Id.
